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These
notes were taken in the wake of Turkey’s local elections which were held on
March 30th, 2014, and on the eve of the first anniversary of Gezi protests. AKP
and Erdogan led the polls once again with 45% of voters in spite of corruption
allegations, impeding a fair probe by purging hundreds of police officers, judges
and prosecutors, banning Twitter and YouTube, and over and above these,
increasing intolerant, reckless and autocratic rule. Erdogan’s next target is to win the
presidential election which will be held in August 2014 and immediately afterwards,
to convert the regime into a presidential regime by amending the constitution. This
means he is gearing up to become the single powerful actor who will dominate
Turkish politics for several more years. In addition, considering the messages within
his public speech right after the elections, it seems that his inflexible policies that are
increasing the tension among diverse societal groups will remain, and that he will
keep his othering language and political attitude against dissent groups. The trouble
is that local elections proved that he has the power and influence that he needs to
achieve his near future goals, and that somehow his othering, tension increasing
rhetoric and conservative social engineering policies really work to clasp his voters
together.
This does not just reflect a kind of bizarreness, but also the fact that a great deal
of people in Turkey still want to follow a powerful father figure who is capable of
deciding on everything regarding societal issues, and who is able to roar at his
opponents, be it the native ones, or the global powers. Many appear to want it
to further stabilize the country, but evidently in Turkish political culture, almighty
leaders are not that odd. Indeed this issue is somehow interrelated with Gezi
protests. During Gezi demonstrations, I believe that another dichotomy of societal
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dynamics in Turkey was revealed, in addition to conventional ones, such as
laicist-Islamist, or Turk-Kurd, or modern-pre-modern etc.: the paternalists versus
antipaternalist dichotomy. In other words, Gezi was an obvious refusal of the
seemingly conventional use of abusive and dictative language of the Turkish state
against individuals, and it presumably will result in some far-reaching consequences.
The new paternalist father of Turks vows growth, but not progress
of the democracy
One point is noteworthy, it is almost a common opinion that Erdogan grasps social
dynamics of Turkey very well and this is one of the most important aspects of his
success. This is true to some extent, but it should also be noted that his political
opponents are too clumsy to offer a significant alternative to AKP power. The social
basis of AKP mainly consists of the relatively deprived and conservative masses,
and furthermore, it is open to new participation from various social groups. That
is to say, it even has the potential to enlarge itself under some circumstances.
Without a strong political actor that is able to aggregate a social cluster such as
AKP’s, releasing tapes or anti-corruption probes (as recently done prior to the
municipal elections) does not answer the purpose of opponents much under current
conditions. Indeed, as some Turkish authors agree, these deprived masses found an
opportunity to constitute their own identities by virtue of AKP, and correspondingly,
Erdogan has employed this dexterously to consolidate his power. As such, banning
Twitter may be expected to have an alternative meaning for the more conservative
masses, as seen in official press releases from the government, as if it is part of
the AKP government’s fight against global giants for national security, and only
chastening them for breaching Turkish laws, rather than impeding fundamental
rights.
Thus, one could say that politics does not have much chance to transform societal
dynamics under these circumstances, but these rapidly changing societal dynamics
in some way will continue to be decisive over politics.
This may also shed light on other recent bizarre developments in Turkish politics.
It is apparent that Erdogan has been pursuing a sort of populist policy for a while,
as he is touching on issues that appeal to the conservative “majority” such as the
banning of abortion, higher restrictions on alcohol sales, and attempts to police
mixed-gender student housing. On the other side, Erdogan’s chief advisor Yigit
Bulut, who has also been known as a conspiracy theorist, in his column, heralds
the spurt of the nation, and birth of a new superpower, which is inescapable and
unavoidable in upcoming years. He already sat on writing a new doctrine for the
future of the country, which is open to public contributions as he declares, and he
demands re-positioning of Turkey in world politics. At this juncture, that he explicitly
recommends ceasing relations with the European Union in a pragmatist view should
not be found surprising.
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Rule of Law vs. Rule of Lawyers: A New Constitutional Politics
Issue?
The gloves are off! Constitutional politics certainly play a significant role within
this process as it has whenever the country is at a crucial juncture. The Twitter
ban was overturned by the Constitutional Court in the meantime, since it violated
universal values and fundamental rights. Erdogan declared that he does not respect
this decision on the grounds that the decision is “unpatriotic”, and that the Court
exceeds its competence and acts for political purposes. As a response, Erdogan was
slammed by Hasim Kilic, the President of the Constitutional Court in the ceremony
for the 52th anniversary of the foundation of the Court, as his criticisms against
recent court decisions were “shallow” and “excessive”. After this challenge, Kilic
was blamed by pro-government media for being a “juristocrat” and “an agent of the
parallel state”, the idiom made up for officials who are the Islamic cleric Fettullah
Gülen’s disciples and deemed traitors by Erdogan after police raids regarding
corruption probes.
Indeed, debates about juristocracy or the rule of lawyers, and judges as powerful
state bureaucrats interfering in politics, are not new in Turkey. For instance, some of
the Constitutional Court’s decisions regarding party closure cases or notorious “367
decision” on presidential elections can be handled in this context. It is obvious that
the Turkish government will try to benefit from the bad reputation of the court and will
keep heating this debate up again and again for all displeasing court decisions. On
the other hand, in the years ahead the Constitutional Court will face a crucial exam in
order to prove how sincerely it is acting in favour of universal democratic values and
that it no longer represents a paternalist mindset.
Sartre’s Freedom might be Turks’ Freedom?
So, what does Gezi mean within this framework? Demonstrations faded away
months ago, and AKP consolidated its power despite all counter attacks in the
meanwhile. Should we now deem that everything happened in vain? Frankly, I do
not think so at all. Gezi demonstrations dealt a severe blow to AKP’s hegemonic
power, or rather to the paternalist policy in Turkey to a certain extent. That is to say,
Gezi will have some far reaching effects, even extending beyond AKP rule in Turkey.
To this end, I agree with those who depict Gezi as ‘68 of Turkey. Therefore, one
could say that Gezi turned into a permanent political movement, but it did not. Thus
nobody should have expected an urgent or mid-term change of power in Turkey. It
presumably left some marks in the subconscious of the society, which could evolve
into a concrete outcome in the meantime. It is now evident that anti-paternalism has
become a serious rival of paternalist culture and polity in Turkey. As it has turned
into a component of the social cement, now it has the chance to become a player
amongst the constructors of the future polity. The political opposition must take
note of this fact while reconstructing itself. However, this is not just an issue for the
opposition. Overlooking this truth will not allow Erdogan or his future successors to
govern Turkey the way he used to.
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Throughout his life, Sartre has maintained that the absence of a father provided him
a certain freedom and he deemed himself fortunate because the early death of his
father resulted in the absence of a superego to struggle against. Turkish society
has never experienced fatherlessness throughout its history. The absence of the
paternalist fatherhood government may one day give this freedom to Turks as well,
and it may even be a key point to dissolving other dichotomies of the society.
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